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INTRODUCTION
As late as 1953 John Wild was a dedicated realist.

His two books on

Plato and his Introduction to Realistic Philosophy indicate his interest in
this type of thinking.

But by 1959 his attitude had changed.

In that year

his book, Human Freedom and Social Order, appeared and he showed himself to be
a philosopher of the Lebenswelt, often in opposition to realism.
The purpose of this thesis is to determine why he changed his
attitude.

To accomplish this I will make an exegesis first of his realism

and then of his Lebenswelt philosophy.

In this way it will become manifest

how they are related and how they differ.

Finally, I will show how he

criticizes realism from his Lebenswelt position in order to make the difference
even mote explicit.

In thus describing his two positions the reasons for his

transition will be laid bare.
His realistic period divides into two phases.

He begins as a

commentator on Plato and an exponent of the traditional realistic position.
I shall indicate his attitude at this time by considering his treatment of
Plato as the originator of the natural law theory.

But, yet still as a

realist, he then takes an interest in the existentialists and writes his
book, The Challenge of Existentialism.

To explain this phase of his thought

I shall show how he thinks of existentialism as an appendage of realism.
Finally, he finds it necessary to leave the realistic position and
become a Lebenswelt philosopher.
~

I shall consider his reasons for this when

summarize his book Human Freedom and Social Order in the third part of this
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thesis.

In the fourth part, I shall show in greater.detail just how he

philosophizes about the Lebenswelt.
The fifth part of this thesis will be to contrast his
realism with that of Lebenswelt philosophy.

concept~on

of

In seeing how he criticizes

Thomism we shall understand even more clearly what his transition has meant.
For in criticizing Thomism, Wild II is in effect criticizing Wild I.

iii

I

CHAPTER I:

REALISTIC PERIOD

In his Introduction to Realistic Philosophy Wild gives a convenient
summary of what he means by realism.

He writes that the three basic doctrines

of realistic philosophy are: "(l) There is a world of real existence which men
have not made or constructed; (2) this real existence can be known by the
(1)

human conduct, individual and social."

Rather than examine what Wild means

by each of these statements we shall consider only the last and thus give a
sample of his realistic philosophy.

In doing this, we shall even further limit

our attention to considering why he thought Plato was a natural law ethician.
In this way we can understand the type of contribution Wild made to realism.
When treating this question in Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory
of Natural Law, Wild first develops a concept of the Natural Law and then shows
how the characteristics of this concept are to be found in Plato's thought.
shall here follow his division.
After describing certain misconceptions of the natural law theory,
Wild begins his positive explanation by showing how it is founded on a
realistic ontology.

Thus he writes,

(1)

John D. Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1948), p.6.

(2)

John D. Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953, p. 105.

(3)

Ibid. p. 107.

We
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"The philosophers of natural law are moral realists. They hold that
certain moral norms are grounded on nature, not merely on human
decree. It is this thesis that binds together the various strands
into a single tradition and which radically separates all of them
from the subjectivist schools of modern thought." (4)
Wild thinks that ''its norms are grounded on the inescapable pattern of
existence itself." (5)

The term 'nature' which refers to this normative

order includes five basic characteristics which Wild thinks occur constantly
in the natural law tradition.

These characteristics are:

"(l) the world is governed by a normative order embedded in the very
being of its component entities; (2) each finite entity is marked by
an intelligible structure distinguishing it from other entities, and
by a universal law; (3) the composite structure of any finite entity
also includes an active factor of dynamism or tendency which urges it
towards further existence not yet acquired; (4) when a concrete
tendency is ordered to act in accordance with the law described
under 2, this action is natural or right; and (5) good, in the most
general sense, is the realization of tendency, evil the lack of
· fulfillment." (6)
When these meanings are applied to man
"they entail three moral doctrines which are characteristic of
realistic ethics. (1) The moral law, which is the abstract pattern
of such activation, is in no sense an arbitrary construction based
on human wish or decree. It is founded on the specific nature of
man and the essential tendencies determined by this nature. Hence
it is not merely a moral law in the usual sense of this word, but
a law of nature, applying equally to all men everywhere. (2) Human
nature is incomplete or tendential. In order to fulfill these
tendencies, human acts must be governed by certain general rules
applying to all men alike. In subhuman animals this direction
proceeds automatically and for the most part without cognitive
activity. But in man it requires the exercise of rational
reflection and choice, free from automatic determination and
(4)

John D. Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953, p. 105.

(5)

Ibid., p. 107.

(6)

Ibid., p. 137.
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physical constraint. Violations of natural law are punished by
natural sanctions of distortion and privation. Acts which are in
accordance with natural law are commonly referred to as virtues.
Such acts are not means to a final value from which they are
separate. They are themselves included in this final activation
and are, therefore, ends in themselves. Finally, (3) the human
good is the existential fulfillment of the human individual. Since
each individual shares certain traits with other members of the
species, this fulfillment will include two distinguishable aspects:(a) acts elicited by his peucliar characteristics and circumstances;
and (b) acts required for the completion of common tendencies he
shares with other members of the species." (7)
In order to verify this theory Wild examines the ethics of the
early Stoics, Marcus Aurelius, Aquinas, Hooker,Grotius and Thomas Paine to
see if his eight points are there contained.

He goes to the texts of these

men and offers many quotations in favor of this theory.
an historical way what the natural law theory is.

Thus, he shows in

By way of contrast he

considers the case of Hobbes and Locke and points out that neither of them
are true natural law ethicians even though they use the terms of the
tradition.

They fail to conform to the five criteria.

Finally Wild asks himself if these five characteristics can be found
within the thought of Plato and if Plato really initiated this type of thinking.

Wild begins his treatment of these questions by pointing out that the

common opinion attributes the founding of the natural law to the Stoics.
writes that the Opinion can be traced back to the German codifier, Samuel
Pufendorf, who initiated it in 1743.

(7)

Ibid., p. 108-109.

He

-
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The two primary objections against the Platonic origination of
~he

natural law theory are:

(1) the term 'law of nature' occurs but seldom

in Plato's works and (2) it is implied that the natural law is a theological
trather than a philosophical theory.
~oncept

Wild answers these by explaining that a

may be expressed in different terms and that Plato could have had a

natural law theory even though he rarely used the term 'law of nature'.

Next,

he argues that the natural law is purely philosophical and points out that

Grotius thought a natural law ethic could be established even if it were
assumed there was no God.
After treating these objections, Wild shows why he thinks Plato
~sed

the concept of nature in the five ways characteristic of the natural law

tradition.

First he gives a series of quotations from such dialogues as the

Protagoras, Phaedo, Parmenides, Gorgias, and Laws, to show that Plato thought
of nature as a normative world order.

Typical of his treatment is the

following:

"Book X of the Laws gives us the final and most explicit statement of
Plato's theory of Natural Law. It contains a complex argument for the
priority of rational life over lifeless matter as the first moving
principle or nature of the cosmos. ;We are told that the materialists
wish to identify this principle (f VC!I) with earth, or air, or fire.
But they do not use the term rightly since as a matter of fact soul
or life is the first moving principle, and therefore, "in a special
sense exists by nature." (8)
"This cosmic order of nature carried its own norms within it. That
which deviates is eliminated. In the case of men who are capable of
exercising choice in the matter, those who would be happy must order
their lives in accordance with natural law: those who seek power in
the madness of hubris are justly punished by frustration of a natural

(8)

Ibid., p. 139.

---
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law founded on the very nature of things and. thus enforced by natural
sanctions. Nature determines what modes of being are good for a thing,
whatever it may be, and also their order of greater or lesser importancE
Thus, wealth is to be sought only for the sake of the body, and the
welfare of the body for the sake of the soul; and this order of
subordination exists by nature." (9)
Second, he develops Plato's concept -of nature as the 'eidetic'
structure of concrete entities.

The burden of his argument here is to point

out how Plato uses the term nature to refer to the form or Idea "which
determines each thing to be of a certain kind and distinguishes it from other
kinds." (10)

He shows how Plato uses the term 'nature' in this way in the

Phaedrus, Republic and Philebus.

For example, in the Phaedrus "when the

charioteer sees a very beautiful object, he is reminded of 'the nature of
the beautiful.'" (11)

Thus, 'nature' in this sense means the essential what-

ness of a thing, the structure which determines it, and distinguishes it
from other entities." (12)
Third, Wild treats what he calls Plato's concept of nature as a
formally determined tendency.

Here he argues that Plato uses the term 'nature'

to refer to something more than just the form or essence of a thing.

He

thinks that nature includes other structural factors than form which determines the concrete thing ''to change and to interact with other entities in
certain appropriate ways." (13)

He writes that, "there is hardly a page in

( 9)

Ibid., p. 139' quoting Plato, Laws 870 B 4-5.

(10)

Ibid., P· 140.

(11)

Ibid., p. 141, quoting Plato, Phaedrus 254B.

(12)

Ibid., P· 141.

(13)

Ibid., P· 141.

-
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Plato which does not either explicitly express or imply" (14) the notion that
finite things have an unfinished or tendential character.

For example,

"Pure forms such as equality and justice are never wholly present
in the concrete beings which only partake of them. Nevertheless,
the forms are somehow partially present in their imitations,
seeking and tending to perfect themselves so far as possible." (15)
So, "In this more inclusive sense, the nature of any entity refers not
only to its essential structure, but to the active dispositions and
tendencies determined by the structure." (16)
These tendencies can be on the subrational level but reason too has its

,,

tendencies. '"By its very nature (ytiof.t) every human soul beholds real
being.'" (17)

It alone can lead us to the human good.
Fourth, in order to tell us how this reason is determined, Wild

treats nature as the correct ordering of incipient tendency.
telling how virtue

a thing's excellence.
it has virtue.

I

(0~t{~)

He begins by

is a universal ontological category which refers to

In so far as each thing completes or fulfills itself,

Virtue is "'the power of attainging what is good.'" (18)

!Whereas "virtues are automatic" (19) in subhuman beings, men "must order their
initial tendencies by habits which are largely under their own control." (20)
Now the standard of rightness to which men must conform in order
to live virtuously is nature.

Right action is described as agreeing with

(14)

Ibid., p. 141.

(15)

Ibid., p. 142.

(16)

Ibid. , p. 142.

(17)

Ibid., P· 143, quoting
Plato, Phaedrus 249 E.

(18)

Ibid., p. 144, quoting Plato,Meno 78

(19)

Ibid., p. 144.

(20)

Ibid., p. 144.

c
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riature.

The ideal community controlled by genuine wisdom is referred to as a

"citY which would be established in accordance with nature." (21)
Fifth, Wild asks himself what is the relation between virtue and
goodness in Plato's thought and in order to find his answer he examines nature
as existential fulfillment.

He first analyzes a series of passages from Plato

concerning good and evil and concludes that there is an intimate relation
between virtue and goodness.

In fact they are so closely fused together that

Plato often considers them as one.

But they are distinct.

"Goodness is ful-

fillment -- the actual being and full possession of realization." (22)
is the inner power to act and exist in accordance with nature." (23)
virtue is the chief cause of good.
virtue.

"Virtue
Thus,

Finite goodness is the actualizing of

"Virtue is included in goodness as its most essential part, as a

power is included in its realization." (24)

Goodness is an existential

category of realization and fulfillment made possible by virtue.
But one achieves goodness only when he acts according to a certain
norm.

Plato tells us what is meant by such a norm or the real nature of an

entity in the Philebus.

Commenting on this Wild writes,

"'If we wish to discover the nature (tyu'~1S) of any form--the hard for

(21)

Ibid., p. 145, quoting Rep. 428 E 9. What Plato actually says is that
a city established according to nature would be wise as a whole because
of the wisdom that resides in the city's ruling element.

(22)

Ibid., p. 149, quoting Symposium 206 A 6, 205 A. Here Plato is saying that
men are lovers of the good and that they long for it to be their's forever. Plato does not stress any relation between virtue and goodness
here.

(23)

Ibid., p. 149.

(24)

Ibid., p. 149.
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instance--we should look at the hardest, rather than the least.hard.'
All changing things are incomplete and tendential. To find out what
i~~at the root of their tendencies, therefore, we should look at those
examples which are 'most extreme and most intense.' Human nature will
be observed at its best in those individuals who have pushed their
capacities to the very breaking point. Here we shall find the most
complete and authentic human life.'" (25)
A natural law ethics
__ that evil is privation." (26)

'~ust

hold that existence is radically good

Plato has this notion and it is expressed in

the fifth way he uses the term 'nature'.
After thus describing the ontological presuppositions of
Platonic ethics, Wild now considers .. the three derived moral principles.
First, he shows that Plato thinks that the natural law is
universal for all men.

While establishing this thesis, he attacks the

accusation of Popper who claims that Plato is a racialist and that Plato
thought of the Greeks as masters and the Barbarians as slaves in much the
same manner as a Nazi would distinguish Aryan and non-Aryan.

This attack

makes Wild furious and he sets out to debunk it by commenting on certain
Platonic myths.

Thus, from pages 25 to 30 and on pages 152 and 153 of

Plato' Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law, Wild shows in detail
what we might summarize by means of some excerpts as follows:
"Thus in the Timaeus all souls are said to have been made according
to one formula, and the myth of the Politicus speaks of the whole
human flock and of one divine shepherd." (27)

(25)

Ibid., pp. 147-148, quoting Philebus 44 E.

(26)

Ibid., p. 151. Wild's development of this fifth way seems weak. His
quotations concerning virtue and goodness are difficult to substantiate
in Plato. It would seem that evil as privation came from St.Augustine.

(27)

Ibid., p. 153.
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"In the Meno virtue is applied equally to men and women in general-to young and old, to bond and free, and finally to 1 all human
creatures.' Plato's discussions of virtue, of philosophy, of law,
and of the soul are uniformly permeated with a universal feeling.
Thus, the philosopher-king thesis of the Republic asserts that unless
philosophers are kings, there will be no end of troubles for all of
mankind. The Republic claims to be not merely a Hellenic ideal, but
one for man in general, barbarian as well as Greek. The subject of
the Phaedo is not the soul of Greeks or Persians but the soul of man.
The unwritten laws of nature hold universally and underlie the
written positive laws of every genuinely human community." (28)
"Plato certainly believed in the moral unity of man. This is proved
by the myths of creation, and by countless passages which may be
quoted from his discussions of the human soul and of wisdom and
virtue, which are the same everywhere for all men." (29)
Second, Wild shows how Plato thought ethical norms are grounded
in nature or how his "conception of virtuous action is founded on his conceptior
of human nature." (30)

To accomplish this he conunents on Plato's concept of

virtue as it is found in the first book of the Republic.
Plato thinks of virtue as a general ontological category.

First he shows how
Any nature which

"'I(

fulfills its proper function

(£t'(~

v) is virtuous.

Next, he points out that,

"The human soul, the animating principle of the human body, is no
exception. It has a certain nature which determines it to certain
modes of action, it organ, which it alone can perform, such as
managing and deliberating, which are specifically mentioned. The
effective performance of these natural functions is virtue: their
warping and distortion is vice." (31)
Finally Wild shows how Plato's concept of duty or obligation is based upon his
understanding of nature and virtue.
he fulfills his nature.

Man has a duty to act in such a way that

He should fulfill his real needs and for this reason,

human society is formed.·

(28)

Ibid., p. 153, From Meno 73 a-d, Rep.473 D., Rep. 499C, Laws 793 B.

(29)

Ibid., p. 30.

(30)

Ibid., p. 153

(31) Ibid., p. 154.
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"The real creator of the city is our human need, a phrase repeated
in practically the same words by Hooker and other def enders of
natural law. Later on, these common human needs were referred to
as human rights, in distinction from incidental appetities. Plato
does not use this terminology. But the concept is clearly and
unambiguously stated." (32)
Third, Wild shows how Plato thought that man's good lies in the
realization of his human nature.

He begins his treatment by commenting on

Plato's words: '"whatever living being possesses the good always, altogether,
and in all ways has no further need of anything, but is completely sufficient."
(33)

Wild tells how Plato thought that original nature is in a state of

deficiency and that the good is the overcoming of this deficiency.
good is always complete or sufficient.

Thus, the

Next, he shows how moral vice is

analogous to disease in the body and how virtue or goodness is like health.
Plato thought of men as complex beings with many functions.

None of these

functions could be fulfilled properly unless they were all hierarchically
subordinated and working in proper order.
"When insubordination and conflict arise, no part can properly perform
its orgon, and the entity remains in a deprived or evil state. Moral
vice or disorder is thus analogous to disease in the body ... All of
this is clearly exemplified and explicitly ~tated in an interesting
passage at the end of the Fourth Book of the Republic." (34)
In concluding his treatment of Plato and the natural law, Wild
writes,
"The texts show that Plato held firmly to three basic tenets of the
philosophy of natural law: first, that the general pattern of
virtuous action required for this is the same for all men everywhere;
second, that certain virtuous modes of action are founded on human
nature just as the healthy functioning of the body is founded on its
(32)

Ibid., p. 154.

(34)

Ibid., p. 155, from Rep. 443 ff.

(33)

Ibid., p. 154; quoting Philebus 60 C.

physical structure; and third, that the end' of man is the realization
or completion of this nature. Some vague conception of moral law is
doubtless as old as man himself. But in the West at least, Plato was
the first philosopher to work out an exact and coherent theory of
natural law. (35)
Such is a typical example of the work Wild did during the first
part of his realistic period.

He was primarily an historian and commentator.

He tried to explicate the philosophy of what he called the realistic tradition.
He usually did this in opposition to philosophers of idealistic or positivistic
persuasion.
In the Spring of 1953, Wild delivered the Mahlon Powell Lectures
at Indiana University.

The argument of these lectures has been published in

his book, The Challenge of Existentialism.

Here we find a transition stage

in his career when he is moving from realism toward a philosophy of the
Lebenswelt.

However, at this period he is still a convinced realist and even

though he has begun to appreciate the discoveries of the existentialists,
he criticizes them from a realistic viewpoint.
In this part of my thesis I shall show how wild was still a
realist when he gave the Mahlon Powell Lectures, but how he had moved to the
second phase of his realistic period, namely, that of existentialism.
show how he considered existentialism to be an appendage of realism.
to accomplish this, I shall·make three considerations.

I shall
In order

First, I shall examine

a series of quotations taken from The Challenge of Existentialism which

(35)

Ibid. , p. 155, 156.
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indicate that he thought existentialism was a part of the realistic tradition.
secon d ' I shall examine his concepts of existentialism ar..d phenomenology to
see how he related these to realism.

Third, I shall consider his concept of

existentialist ontology to see why he thought that this was a new empericism
and a revival of traditional ontology.

In limiting myself to these three

considerations, I shall have to leave out his treatment of epistemology and
ethics.

But, in spite of this, I can still accomplish my purpose -- to see

why. he thought of existentialism as an aspect of realism.
Right from.the beginning of his Book, Wild's purpose is clear.
He wants to show how philosophy that has been broken down by non-empirical
and anti-metaphysical theories can be restored by existentialism and a return
to realism.

In his first chapter, The Breakdown of Modern Philosophy, he

describes metaphysics as he dici in the first phase of his realism.

He tells

that it deals with existence whether potential and actual, or substantial and
accidental. (36)

Then he writes "at the present time in the universities of

England and America, this discipline is dead." (37)
and ethics have met with a like disaster.

Of course, epistemology

Practical awareness which deals

with existential problems has been disregarded by those who focus their
attention upon pure theory rather than practise, on essence rather than
existence. (38)

These theories eventually end in skepticism where they are

cut off from the concrete world.

And in turn this epistemological skepticism

(36) Jehn D. Wild, The Challenge of Existentialisn;, Bloor.ling ton: Indiana U.
Press, 1959; p. 16.
(37) Ibic., p. 17.
(38) Ibid., p. 20.
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Ir

weakens mcral convkticn. (39)

Some philosophers think "it is a naive.mistake

to telieve that any such thing as ethics exists as a responsible discipline."
(40)

Wild thinks that existentialism and reci.lism can remeby these
problems.

Existentialism is a rE:birth cf realism and if it is purified by the

traditional philosophy a true metaphysics a.rid its consequent epistemology and
ethics will be restored.

Wild begins to prove this thesis by showing how

Kierkegaard is, in a certain sense, a realist.

lie po]nts out that even though

Ki.erkega2.rd made bitter atta.cks upon theoretical reason and claimed to be an
irrationalist, we cannot take this irrationalism seriously, for we would then
"have to reject his w"Titings, which are a triumph of theoretical analysis." (41
Wild thinks that even though,
"this irrationalism is the most urfortunate yet one of tte most
influential factors in Kierkegaard's testament to the modern age •..
we are now able to see that Kierkegaard's achievE:ments are rather a
triumph of rational description and analysis." (42)
Concerning existentialism Wild further writes, "or.. the conti.Pent
of Europe this is now the dominant philosophy, and a challenge to all living
minds.

Its point of view is starkly realistic.'' (43)

However, Wild as a

realist is not completely pleased with existentialism and his criticisms of
this philosophy indicate that he is still very much a realist at the time he
gave the Mahlon Powell Lectures.

He writes,

{39)

Ibid., p. 23.

(40)

Ibid.~

p. 24.

(42)

Ibid., p. 54.

(43)

Ibie.,p. 55.

(41)

Ibiri., p. 54.

r

I
I

r

-----~~~~~~·
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I

"The existentialist insightf:. are marked ty partiality at every· one of
the four levels we have considered ... We shall turn. briefly again to
the chief sources of existentialist thought for a critical review ...
We shall consider these (its more serious errors) as they affect the
four major aspects cf existenti2list thought: its method, its metaphysics, its view of krowledge, and finally, its ethics. In each of
these phases, ~e shall find that it suffers from omission, exaggeration, and sometimes from positive error." (44)

He goes on to show in detail

he~

this philosophy is man-centered to the exclu-

sion of the rest of the world, how brute facts are only described and not
explained, how it denies the principle of causality, and how Sartre, therefore,
has no ethics.

He attempts to show how it has slurred over essences in think-

ing that existence is given without essence and how as a result it is antiintellectual.

He thinks that the gerrr:s of ske.pt:l.cism are found in Kierkegaard

c:rnd th2.t his followers often terld toward moral solipsism and anarchy.

"No

adequate or even noteworthy social philosophy has as yet come from existentialist sources." (45)
After his criticism he further indicates that he thinks realism
and existentialism can be cne by showing hm1' existentialism can overcome its
weaknesses by becoming allied with realism.

Thus he writes,

"In these concludir.g chapters, we shall rr,ake a few suggestions concerning the way in which, as it seems to t~s, the genuin.e insights
of this new phjlosophy may be sustained by bringing them into
relation with the allied insights of realism." (46)
Wild's equaticn of rea]ism and exister..tialism will become more
meaningful if we now consider wtat he meant by phenomenology and existentialism
at this pojnt in his career.

In orcier tc cio tl:is, we shall begin by commenti.ng

on thrEe quotations which will indicate how he related phenomenology and

(44)

Ibid., p. 178.

(45)

Ibid., p. 184.

(46)

Ibid., p. 187.
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existe.nti2.lisrr.

'lhe:n, we shall consider his idea thc:.t existentialism is

primarily concerned with l:uman existence.

And finally, we shall show how he

relates existentialism and realism.
Wild writes that the men who use the phenomenological method
are interested
"in the concrete data of irr.mediate experience, and in discribing those
data so far as possible, exactly as they are given." (L,7)
Then he ·wr:.i.te.s that the existentialists have.
"applied this method to many regions not previously explored, but
especially to the pervasive data of existence, awareness, and human
value which lie at the root of the disciplines of metaphysics,
epistemology and ethics." (48)
And again he writes,
"there is no real reason why phenomenology should be restricted to
human existence. Other modes of being can also be described and
analyzed." (49)
These quotations are typical of Wild's thought at this time and he constantly
repeats the ideas contained within them.

If we examine them, we see that he

thinks of phenomenology as an attitude of interest in the concrete and as a
method of description.

Also, the last quotation indicates that phenomenology

includes some kind of analysis.

The existentialists are phenomenologists in

so far as they describe and analyze human existence.

Hence, we can see that

· phenomenology and existentialism are different in that .the first is a method
the latter uses and which could possibly be used by others.

They are alike in

that they can both treat the immediate data of human existence.

At this point, Wild does not indicate much appreciation for

( 4 7)

Ibid . , p . 5 7 .

(48)

Ibid., P: 57.

(49)

Ibid., p. 58.
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Husserl and his technical meaning of phenomenology.

He only mentions

Husserl twice by name and the first time he criticizes him for being an
essentialist.(50)

However, Wild does have one passage wherein he indicates

what he means phenomenological description and analysis.

He writes,

"The first step in the attainment of such truth is the use of all
our cognitive faculties--feeling, sense, and reason--in the description of objects as they are given. The next step is to analyze out
the essential aspects of these complex data, and the relation forms in
which they are united. These belong to what we call phenomenology.
At every stage, our eyes are fixed on the object we are describing.
No inference must be allowed to creep into the picture. No fixed
interpretation should warp our view. Our attention is focused
sclely on the existing phenomena as they are present to us, and on
the constitutive structure of this presence. When this has been
accurately achieved, we have already embarked on the last phase of
the process, the quest for explanation in terms of reasons and
causes." (51)
Wild goes on to call this last phase an "inferential theory that penetrates
far beyond the horizons revealed by our practical activity." (52)

Hence, it

would seem that Wild pictures philosophical reasoning as having three phases.
First, there is description, and second, analysis.
phenomenology.

These are included within

Third, there is inference which the existentialists lack.

But,

before we consider how realism can provide this, we must first take up Wild's
notion that existentialism is primarily concerned with human existence.
Wild thinks that the primary characteristic of existentialism
is its concern for

human existence.

Thus he writes,

"When we regard man from an ontological point of view, we find that he
is marked off from other beings not merely by certain determinate
traits (essences), but by a peculiar mode of being which marks him

(50)

Ibid., p. 73.

(51)

Ibid., p. 193.

. (52)

Ibid. p. 194.
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off even more radically. This human way of being is now called
existence, and has given its name to the new philosophy we are
studying." (53)
In order to understand what he means by this we must now examine
his concept of existential ontology.

In so doing, we will see in more detail

why he thinks existentialism and realism can be one and we will be able to see
how he thinks realism can help existentialism to be even more ontological.
He begins his treatment of existential metaphysics by showing how
it is a radical empiricism.

By this lable, he designates a philosophical

position which is neither pan-objectivistic (e.g. positivism) nor pansubjectivistic (e.g. Cartesianism).

The new empiricism (·explicitly rejects

the reduction of everything to either object or subject.

Instead it insists

upon an intentional notion of consciousness such that there must always be a
subject and object pole.

In order to prove this statement, Wild qv.otes certain

passages from Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel.

Then, he

comments on these passages to show how these existentialists are true empiricists as opposed to pseudo-empiricists such as Russell.

Finally, he shows how

their radical empiricism at least enables them to begin philosophizing in a
correct way since they are treating being as it is.

But, I will not give the

detail of Wild's argument since one example will suffice to show his method.
Rather, I will give that detail now in showing how he thinks existentialism
has revived ontology.
Wild begins the part of his book entitled The Revival of Ontology

(53)

Ibid., pp. 84-85.

with the words,
"One result of the new empiricism is the rediscovery of those pervasive
protocols which require ontological analysis and explanation. This
means that metaphysics can no longer be dismissed as a jumble of
purely speculative theories which are subject to no empirical check."
(54)
The existential protocols which Wild explains by commenting on the words of
the five leading existentialists are:

essence and existence, existential

vectors, truth as identity, good and evil,
potency and change.

contradiction and contingency,

As an example of the method by which Wild proceeds

throughout the book we shall now consider his treatment of essence and
existence.

He begins,

"The existentialists clearly recognize the classical distinction
between determinate structure, or essence, and the act of existing.
But in violent reaction against the essentialism of modern thought,
these thinkers all place an extreme emphasis on existence, and agree
in asserting its priority over essence. Thus, Heidegger says that
'the 'essence' of man lies in his existence.' He uses the term
Dasein in order to express not a determinate whatness (essence) but
rather a mode of being (sein) always proceeding from a certain
position (da) into which he has been thrown." (55)
Such is the way in which Wild begins to argue that Heidegger has
contributed to the revival of ontology.

However, I think that in Wild's inter-

pretation, there is a fundamental misunderstanding.

Wild would seem to equate

Heideggers'use of existence with the traditional use of existence.

However,

Heidegger writes explicitly that he does not make such an equation.
"But here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to
designate the Being of this entity as 'existence' (Existenz), this
term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the
traditional term 'existentia'; ontologically, existentia is

(54)

Ibid. , p. 64.

(55)

Ibid., p.65, quoting Sein
und Zeit, p. 42.
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tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is
essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein's character." (56)
Furthermore, it seems that Heidegger would be an essentialist
in the way that Wild is using the term, for when he writes "the 'essence' of
nasein lies in its existence" he means that he is setting man off from other
entities by means of this characteristic of existence.

Even though this

ability to-be-there is not a 'what',it is still more like the traditional
essence than the traditional existence.
I do not mean to say that I think that Heidegger has not promoted
a revival of ontology.

However, I think that concerning this issue, Wild has

misrepresented him.
Next, Wild shows how Heidegger thinks that man's existence is
prior to what he is.

He writes, "Dasein is always ahead of himself.

his possibilities, and in his being somehow understands them.
he is going to be." (57)

He is

He chooses how

But, Wild feels uneasy with Heidegger's notion that

Dasein has no determinate structure.

He writes,

"Heidegger does not explain fully why the realistic notion of essence
or nature is inadequate to express these existential characteristics.
He simply states dogmatically that it applies only to inert things
that are simply there on hand before us." (58)
Two observations are in order here.

First, Wild might understand

Heidegger on this issue if he saw that Heidegger does not equate the

(56)

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. by Macquarrie and Robinson,
New York and Evanston, Harper and Row, 1962, p. 68.

(57)

Ibid., p. 66.

(58)

Ibid., p. 66.
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existence of Dasein with the existence of traditional realism.

In short, as

M'ild writes but does not understand, "the 'essence of Dasein lies in its
existence."

Dasein does have an essence, a determining characteristic.

Dasein

is distinct from other entities in that he is indetermined, he is free to
determine himself. Second, it can again be pointed out how Wild is here a realist.
In so far as the existentialist fits into the mold of realism, Wild praises
him.

In so far as he does not Wild criticizes him.

Sometimes, as in this

case, Wild, in his eagerness to have the existentialist promoting the cause of
realism, is even unfair in his treatment of the existentialist.

He sees too

much of traditional realism in his thought.
After showing Heidegger's thought on the distinction between
essence and existence,Wild then quotes Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel and
attempts to show how they too recognize the distinction.

He criticizes

Sartre and Jaspers in the same way he did Heidegger and then he shows how
Marcel has "come out with a qualified defense of the notion of essence." (59)
He quotes Marcel as saying,
'"It is clear that reflection on the meanings of words must be
directed, just as Plato wanted it to be, towards a grasp of what
traditional philosophers used to call essences. One cannot protest
too strongly against a kind of existentialism, or a kind of caricature of existentialism which claims to deprive the notion of
essence of its old value and to allow it only a subordinate
position." (60)

(59)

Ibid., p.66.

(60)

Ibid., p. 66; quoting Marcel, Man against society?
p. 85.
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Then Wild writes,
"This is a significant criticism by one who has a thorough command of
·the literature. Determinate structure is certainly found in
experience. This pervasive factor cannot be permanently evaded and
ignored by any philosophy which seriously hopes to be really
empirical and to achieve even a minimum degree of intelligibility."
(61)
Wild treats the other existential protocols in this same way.
By existential vectors he refers to 'Being-in-the-world', 'Being-with-others',
and 'Being-towards-my-death'.

He thinks that these are "new complex concepts

which express the relational structure of being." (62)

The existentialists

forged these because of their respect for concrete data and in so doing they
have rejected on phenomenological grounds that monistic idealism which is
incompatible with "that personal existence and freedom which is a primary
object of existentialist study." (63)

Thus in refuting a form of idealism,

existentialism has furthered the cause of traditional realism.

Wild argues

in the same way concerning the existentialist treatment of truth, goodness,
contingency and change.
Throughout his entire book, Wild treats four aspects of philosophy:

method, metaphysics, epistemology and ethics.

He attempts to show in

each case how the findings of the existentialists have contributed to the
traditional realistic understanding of these aspects of philosophy.

Whenever,

the existentialists do not agree with that tradition, Wild criticizes them.
We have seen an example of his approach in our consideration of his treatment

(61)

Ibid., p. 66.

(62)

Ibid., p. 67.

(63)

Ibid., p. 68
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of the existentialist metaphysics.

We have seen why he thinks that existen-

tialism and phenomenology can be compatible with the realistic tradition.
have seen how at the time he wrote The Challenge of Existentialism, he
considered existentialism to be an appendage of realism.

We

23

Upon reading Wildls next book, Human Freedom and Social Order,
we find ourselves in another philosophical world.

Gone is his interest in the

world of change which he explained by such categories as potency and act,
substance and accident and causality.

Instead, we find him dealing with the

livedpworld of the person and using such categories as self conscious activity,
global meanings and transcendence.

In this book he explicates his philosophy

of the Lebenswelt and has stepped out of the realistic tradition.

In order to

show how he had one this, we shall first describe what Wild means by a
philosophy of the Lebenswelt and then take up his new position in ethics.
We might begin with his statement, "the purpose of philosophy
is to gain an understanding of the Lebenswelt which avoids the errors of
partiality, inaccuracy and superficiality." (64)

To understand this, we must

first know what Wild means by the Lebenswelt and only afterwards, can we hope
to understand his philosophy of the Lebenswelt.
Lebenswelt is a German word made popular in philosophic circles

by the contemporary phenomenologists.

It refers to the lived-world of every

day human existence as opposed to the objective world of the scientist.
According to Wild, the three most important aspects of its structure are:
self conscious activity, global meaning and transcendence. (65)
As he points out self conscious activity has three chief

(64)

John Daniel Wild, Human Freedom and Social Order, Durham, N.C.:
University Press, 1959, p. 116.

(65)

Ibid., p. 137.
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characteristics:

each person is the center of his own Lebenswelt; this center

is constituted by his acts, and in performing these actions the person has a
cirect awareness of himself.

Following Husserl, Wild holds that the Leben-

swelt is always relative to the person who constitutes it by his actions.

As

a result each person has an immediate and certain knowledge of himself as
subject when he acts, and it is only in his action that he can know himself as
subject.
object.

For when he tries to know himself objectively, he knows only an
Hence, as we shall later see, this structur of the Lebenswelt enables

the philos9pher to have a knowledge of existential depth by which he can
escape the superficial attitude which knows not the subject. (66)
At the same time, "the Lebenswelt is pervaded by global meanings
which unlike facts, are to some degree subject to individual choice and
control." (67)

These meanings or values-cared-about give order to the lived-

world of both individual and culture.

They link together in harmonious

unity the several parts of the world.

Hence, an individual's world is

ordered by his basic orientation or set of values.

For the miser, all things

will have meaning in that they point toward money.

The hypochondriac, on the

other hand, has a lived-world ordered by health getting.

Of course, these

global meanings are also characteristic of any given culture.

For every

human group has an ultimate value for which it strives, giving meaning to all
else.

(66)

Ibid., p. 137.

(67)

Ibid., p. 137.
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These global meanings have an intimate relation with the
phenomena of human space and human time which strictly speaking might be
called structures of the Lebenswelt themselves.

Together with the objects

of his care, each person is involved in a structure of human temporality
very different from objective time.
lived-world.

Hence, time differs from lived-world to

An hour is much longer for the patient in a dentist's chair then

for the boy fishing.

So human space is much different than geometric space.

It is not just miles that separate the home-sick farmer from his land but
miles of effort and care.

(68)

It should be mentioned that the lived body has an important role
in this value structure of skeleton of meaning which links the component parts
of the Lebenswelt.

It is the center of the Lebenswelt or medium of action.

In the manner of Merleau-Ponty, Wild shows why "care will be reflected in my
body and its attitudes to surrounding objects." (69)

Even a given culture is

highly influenced by the geographical region in which it is found.

"One's

body is the center of human space, and is surrounded. by objects at hand for
use."

(70)
But within the Lebenswelt, there is also the experience of

transcendence.

For besides the global meanings which order and pervade the

world, there are also persons and things which one experiences as being
completely independent of himself. (71)

These persons and things transcend me

(68)

Ibid., p. 139.

(69)

Ibid., p. 138.

( 7 0)

Ibid . , p . 14 0 .

(71)

Ibid., p. 141.

but not completely.

There is also the experience of the holy or mysterious

which has even a more radical transcendence.

both individual and culture has

this experience.
We can become aware of the transcendent by self conscious pathways
or by objective pathways.

In the first way, we have but to concentrate "on our

self-conscious meanings, choices, and feelings." (72)

In the second way, we

note "the checks of objective reason, or confront symbolic phenomena such as
the holy." (73)

By our awareness of the ultimate horizon of mystery, we are

able to recognize all human worlds as being views of the world that transcends
them all.

Hence, we are aware of the unity of the world.
Such then is the structure of the human life-world.

But before

considering Wild's philosophy of the Lebenswelt, perhaps we could better
understand it by seeing how he contrasts it with the objective world of the
scientist.

In doing this, he uses Plato's allegory of the cave to show that

the Lebenswelt is both prior to the objective world and even more inclusive.
Of course, the intellectualist Plato contends that the upper
world of the intellect is prior to the lived-world of the cave.
the facts as he interprets them, Wild inverts the myth.

But to fit

For him, the cave is

the world of the intellect into which the intellectualist descends from the
lived-world.

Every thinker is first a citizen of the Lebenswelt, and every

culture first has years _of concrete experience before the period of reflection.

(72)

Ibid., p.141.

(73)

Ibid., p. 141.
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Hence, the lived-world is prior to and independent of the objective universe.
(74)

But also, it is richer and far more inclusive.

Science by

nature can deal only with an abstracted segment of the universe.

"The

universe of science does not encompass and precede the world of life.

It is

rather the concrete world of human existence from which science takes its
origin, and in which it lives and has its being ... The cave cannot include
the upper world." (75)
The Lebenswelt then is structured of self conscious activity,
global meaning and transcendence.
the objective world.

It is

prior~to

and more inclusive than

With this in mind, we are now prepared to see what

Wild means by "philosophy of the Lebenswelt."
To do this, we shall first examine what he calls the three
criteria of philosophy or wholeness, analytic clarity and existential depth.
These three criteria, of course, are the opposite of the three errors which
we saw in his statement quoted earlier, "the purpose of philosophy is to gain
an understanding of the Lebenswelt which avoids these errors of partiality,
inaccuracy and superficiality." (76)
Wholeness or lack of partiality refers to the "global view
which leaves out no

(74)

Ibid., p. 63.

essential structure of this concrete world.

(7 5)

Ibid . , p. 66.
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In order to

Ibid., p. 116.
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achieve this, the philosopher must make an effort to get outside of himself,
and even to arrive at a standpoint which is outside the world." (77)

Plato's

effort is an example of seeking this holoscopic view for he sought to view
"the world in the light of the good which is beyond our human existence, and
even beyond all being." (78)
But also the forte of Aristotle or analytic clarity is necessary
for a good philosophy of the Lebenswelt.

For looking at the world from a

distance may result in a certain inaccuracy or the second error of

philosophy~

To prevent this,attention must be devoted to "a careful scrutiny of essential
parts, one by one, in order to attain a detailed accuracy.'' (79)
But then, this objective accuracy may cause in the philosopher
a superficial attitude in which he does not consider the subjective.

He may

lack existential depth in that he views himself and others only as objects and
not as subjects.

Hence, these three:

wholeness, analytic clarity and

existential depth, are the criteria to which a philosophy of the Lebenswelt
must conform.
While following these criteria,philosophy has a twofold task,
namely its primary function of revealing structures of the Lebenswelt and its
secondary function of sweeping synthetic speculation.

Strictly speaking, the

first is the philosophy of the Lebenswelt and the second is traditional
realism.

(78)

Hence, traditional realism is but a secondary phase of the

Ibid., p. 116.

(79)

Ibid., p. 117.
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rhilosophy of the Lebenswelt.
'the world of concrete

In its first task of describing and analyzing

experience, philosophy is "concerned with the direct

evidence of lived experience which is neither exclusively subjective nor exclusively objective, but both together in one." (80)

In the light of this

evidence and using the phenomenological method, its primary task is to
reveal such structures as lived space, lived time and historicity.

In the

next part, we shall treat this phenomenological method in detail.
However, in revealing these basic phenomena certain notions will
~e

encountered "whose clarification involves overarching speculation and

interpretation of the kind traditionally ref erred to as ontology or
metaphysics." (81)

Questions such as those concerning being, meaning, truth,

and transcendence bring forth

the second function of philosophy.

The

experience of such phenomena "enable us to grasp the life world as a whole,
and call forth a total interpretation." (82)
In comparing these two functions of philosophy, Wild says that
the first is "an understanding of freedom and its conditions" and the second
is the "actual exercise of noetic freedom." (83)

I shall treat this special

problem in the next section.
Because of its freedom philosophy is not in the ancillary service
of either science or religion. (84)
(80)

Ibid., p. 89.

(84)

Ibid., p. 87.

(81)

In fact it "should bring philosophers into

Ibid., p. 145.

(82)

Ibid., p. 89.
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close touch with other disciplines ... and should act as a bond linking the
members of a faculty together in a common task to which all can contribute."
(85)

But on the other hand, the evidence for the speculative function of

philosophy is "ambiguous and open to divergent interpretations." (86)

And

hence, any attempt to clarify such basic notions as being, truth and value
"must rest upon faith in a guiding image of some sort that cannot be
conclusively confirmed by any available evidence." (87)
This brings us to the third part of this section or the
relation between Christian faith and the philosophy of the Lebenswelt.

We

have seen what Wild means by the Lebenswelt and the philosophy of it.

Now

we shall examine his definition of Christian philosophy or that "purely human
discipline striving to take account of the evidence accessible to all, but
ultimately inspired by the guiding image of Christian faith." (88)
seek to understand two new ideas:

Hence, we

what is his concept of Christian Faith?

and how is it a guiding image for the philosophy of the Lebenswelt?
Wild defines religion as "the ultimate ·devotion to a transcendent
mystery directly encountered in the concrete world of existence." (89)
"a
(90)

It is

dimension of human existence," and "due to a recognition of transcendence."
"As concern for an ultimate myster, religion cannot be essentially

identified with rational theology." (91)

Of course, the Christian faith is a

type of religion and, hence, it also differs from reason.

For faith is "the

(85)

Ibid. , p. 145.

(86)

Ibid., p. 89.

(87)

Ibid., p. 90.

(88)

Ibid. , p. viii.

(89)

Ibid. , p. 34.

(90)

Ibid. p. 39.

(91)

Ibid . , p. 85.
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ultimate concern for which we are ready to make real sacrifices in ordering our
existence and reason is the exact understanding of things around us and of our
changing situation in history." (91)
But the Christian faith not only differs from reason it also
differs from myth.

For unlike myth it,

"is addressed to free, self-conscious persons;: .. it is essentially
involved in human events that occurred in human history, and it
exists in this history; ... It can meet the serious equestioning of
rational reflection, and even requires a full development of reason
for mastery over the animals and the earth; ... It is free and open
not only to a deepening self-correction of itself, but to a development and renewal of all human fields and occupations." (92)
Now the Christian faith which is neither reason nor myth exists
in the Lebenswelt.

"Its initial acts are not rational hypotheses or

propositions subject to proof or disproof by objective evidence." (93)
Instead "the Bible is concerned with human existence in the world of man ... and
it expresses many insights into the nature of this existence in the ordinary
language of mankind." (94)

Hence, the Bible coupled with the tradition of the

church, which is also part of the Christian faith, contains historic events.
At this point, we can begin to see the relation between faith and
the philosophy of the Lebenswelt.

For faith with "Its own kind of evidence,

and its own distinctive modes of understanding" (95) while not to be confused
with philosophy, should be related to it.

As we have seen the philosophy of

(91)

Ibid. , p. 85.

(92)

Ibid., p. 42.

(94)

Ibid., p. 43.

(95)

Ibid.,_p. 44.
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Ibid., p. 72.
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the Lebenswelt has two functions, namely the analysis of the concrete livedi.,orld and then the speculation concerning the transcendent, which is a
structure of the lived-world.

Now, Wild contends that in the history of

philosophy this speculation has always been guided by certain images.

Plato

saw "everything in the light of the transcendent idea of the good." (96)
St. Augustine had "God's living presence ... communicating to him a sense of His
eternal and timeless truths." (97)

Kant and Hegel had their images.

But

Wild argues that the Philosophy of the Lebenswelt should be guided by the
image of Christian Faith.

The Christian philosopher should "openly accept

the guiding image of his faith in making ultimate clarifications where the
evidence falls short." (98)
Wild calls the relation between Christian faith and reason one
of dialectical tension.

In this relation "the organic content of the faith

is considered not as a set of propositions from which, with the aid of rational
first principles, philosophic conclusions can be deduced, but rather as a
guiding image, indirectly indicating ideas, atmospheres, and modes of approach
that can be worked out in a purely secular way, and tested by secular evidence
available to all, without jeopardizing the autonomy of the field in question."
(99)
Such is Wild's philosophy of the Lebenswelt as presented in

(96)

Ibid., p. 119.

(99)

Ibid.,

p.
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Ibid., p. 119
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Human Freedom and Social Order.
consequent ethical position.

Now in that same book, we shall examine his

To do this, it will be necessary to consider the

subject from the two aspects of individual and social ethics.

For in social

ethics, he still holds the natural law position of self realization ethics.
However, in individual ethics, this position is rejected for a person centered
affirmative ethics.
In taking up this new position, we shall see first why Wild
rejected a self realization ethics for

tle individual and second, we shall

examine the characteristics of this new ethics.

In carrying out the first

of these tasks, we shall summarize Wild's contrast of the five characteristics
of self realization ethics with the five of personal ethics.
The first characteristic of traditional ethics is objective
calculation.

This deliberation about means to an end "presupposes an

objective understanding of the laws of nature and the natural consequences of
different kinds of acts, as well as a grasp of the final end which must be
already understood theoretically before the process can begin." (100)
However, such a process is not used by a free human person as he makes his
basic decisions.

Personal understanding is not restricted merely to acts

within a fixed world framework.

Instead, the person often uses a type of

existential reflection which "also makes use of feeling, passion, expressive
discourse, and every revealing power to which we have access." (101)

(100)

Ibid., p. 156.

(101)

Ibid., p. 168.

Then too, "traditional ethics has been based upon universal
laws or principles which can be understood in the very same way by different
minds." (102)

For, once a moral end has been determined which is based on a

true account of human nature and its properties, "rules which must be followed
by everyman if he is to realize this final end must be clearly formulated."
(103)

But, "personal ethics requires something more than the universal pre-

scriptions of social and moral law." (104)

Universal rules only mark the

lkmits of a person's finite freedom and apply to him negatively.

"if he is to

be given any helpful guidance, a very different kind of ethics is required."
(105)

An ethics which treats the whole person in his concrete situation would

not focus its attention on the general pattern by

~hich

human life can be

realized but upon the radical exercise of human freedom.
Self realization ethics is based on a concept of the fixed self
which as an enduring substance maintains certain essential properties as it
progresses toward its end.

Virtues and vices are considered accidents which

this substance acquires as it moves from potency to act.

But this theory

leaves no room for essential growth and creativity. (106)

"Serious questions

may be raised as to whether the traditional thing categories do justice to
existential becoming." (107)

If attention is focused on becoming and giving

rather than resting and possessing there would be categories to better explain
the phenomena of divine grace and direct love.

A person is his history.

(102)

Ibid. p. 159.

(103)

Ibid., p. 155.

(104)

Ibid.,p. 171.
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Ibid., p. 171.

(106)

Ibid., p. 161

(107)

Ibid.,p. 162.

His acts cannot rightly be understood "as accidents added to a fixed essence."
(108)
Of course, it is a fact

that the person does have works which

he can look upon as objects different from himself.

If these works conform

to an objective standard, he is deserving of merit; if they do not he is
guilty.

But objective works, norms and merits are not the only facts. (109)

There also exists a self revealing activity which proceeds sporadically and
authentically over long intervals of time.

Hence, there should be a deeper

ethics of my own existence in its full integrity which recognizes these acts
as well as works.
From what has been written it can be seen that self realization
ethics asserts the priority of the past.

It looks back to an "already given

nature, or self, that is to be realized." (110) The general nature of the
end twoard which this self should strive is also predetermined.

"Even grace

itself must remain within the limits prescribed by this objective nature."(111)
"All justifiable hope for the future is based on a memory of the past."(112)
But as the person is his history,so ethics should be historically oriented.
It should be based on a priority of the future, which is bathed in mystery and
continually open to further creative understanding.
Such .. are five reasons which Wild gave for rejecting a natural law

(108)

Ibid., p. 174.

(109)

Ibid., p. 164.

(lll)

Ibid. , p. 164.

(112)

Ibid., p. 178.

(110)

Ibid., p. 164.
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ethics for the individual.

He does not think that a self realization theory

based upon objective calcualtion, universal law, the self as world center,
works and the priority of the past fully accounts for the existential facts of
personal life.
tial ethics.

In place of this theory, he proposes a new Christian, existenAs we have seen, it is based instead upon existential thought,

the existing person, becoming and giving, acts and the priority of the future.
We shall now examine this new ethics in more detail.
Perhaps we should begin by pointing out the radical difference of
this ethics from all traditional theories.

In one place, Wild show-s how all

previous thec·ries have a common pattern of end, means, etc. (113)
mentions that this new theory is totally different.

Then, he

In fact, he even writes
•

"this is not an ethcis at all, but a way of existing in the world.

It does

not provide us with a method of calculating the success and failure of our
works, but suggests a way of interpreting our life in the world as a whole
that arises from the self-revealing of our lived existence.

It is concerned

not so much with abstract laws and principles as with the concrete persons
for the sake of whom all laws and principles are laid down.

It leads us not

toward self-satisfaction but toward freedom and self-transcendence.

It pre-

supposes a realization of the conditions required for personal existence.''(114)

However, in spite of this description of the difference between
his theory and traditional ethics, Wild still calls his thought "the
Christian ethics of love and self-transcendence which is open to the individual

(113)

Ibid., p. 156

(114)

Ibid., p. 182
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person." (115)

While his theory cannot be reduced tt> any systematic order, it

still has the following features:

"First, it is a mode of revealing thoug1'.t

which is acutely self-conscious all the while it is conscious of objects.
second, i t must be aware of the norms it is presupposing.

Finally, third, it

must be concerned with self-world structure as a whole and with those clashes
between divergent world interpretations which occur in what we now call
philosophical discourse."(116)
This new ethics is especially sensitive to the freedom of the
person.

His being-open-to-otherr1ess is that freedom which lies at the root

of his being.

Reason is but an expression of this freedom.

In no way does a

universal determinism destroy personal freedom in this theory.

For here a

person is free to love another directly and even to sacrifice without self
interest.

We might say that the chief motive of this theory is to save the

fact of human freedom.
Because of this concern for freedom "It may be said of this
Christian philosophy, as is said of Kantian ethics, that it is purely formalistic and tells us nothing about precisely what we ought to do." (117)

Instead

of a closed sys terr. which tells us what we ought to do, this ethics will be in a
world of love which is beyond the law.

The person will be concerned not so

much with what to do as with how to do it.

This ethics has been lived by

those who "put persons above the la.w, and have risked their lives for freedom."
(118)

(115)

Ibid. p. 185.

(118)

Ibiri., p. 183.

(116)

Ibid., p. 176.

(117)

Ibid., p. 182.
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It has the spirit of freedom in fa.ith.

(119)

Such then is the Christian ethics of the Lebenswelt.
principle concern is to promote the freedom of the person.

Its

Hence, it differs

radically from an ethics concerned with perfection of a nature.

But still therE

remains the problem of social ethics and its relation to individual ethics.
Hence, in the following part of our summary of Wild's new philosophy, we shall
first consider what he calls "the gap between individual and social action,"
and then, we shall consider his plan for "bridging the gap."
One has but to look around in order to see the gap between
individual anci social action.

Wild describes the insurmountable chasm which

yawns between social and individual ethics in the following manner, "personal
action is open to a radical choice of ends as well as means. It is concerned
with theindividual in his concrete integrity.

It is a dialectical becoming

which involves the sacrifice of. a past self, as well as the coming of a new
self to be born, and is centered in something transcendent rather than in a
structure already formec.

It expresses itself in acts where the self is

totally present rather than in works form which the self can star.cl aside and
is guided by a forward-looking historicity.

Political action, on the other

hand, follows a calculation 0f means exclusively, not ends.

It is centered

in a fixed constitution already understood and objectified, and is governed
by abstract principles and laws.

It issues in works that can be objectified

and compared with extrinsic norms, a.nd

is governed by a backward looking hope."

(120)
(119)

Ibid., p. 184.

(120)

Ibid., p. 208.
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He then mentions how the "Christian ethics of love and sacrifjce,
expressed in the sermon en the mount ... is still alive in the hearts of western
individuals, and is still used as a standard for judging the significance of
ind:i.vidual conciuct." (121)

But, on the other hand, he points out that it

would seem absurd for any political group to love its enemies.

If a natjon

was not anxious for its life, it would be gobbled up in the struggle for
power.

In short, pol.itical ethics is not Christian.

There is a gap between

individual and social ethics.
The causes of this gap are:

(1) "Our personal acts arise from

the depths of our being and express a way of existing in the world to which
not only objective thought, but feeling and every revealing power at our
disposal have made essential contributions." (122)

"Political action, on the

other harLd, arises from a process of deli.berate calculation which is restricted
to definite intervals of ti.rr,e." (123)

(2)

"My personal action grows not

merely from detached observations of myself and others as ojbects but from
revealing powers that inhabit it. 11 (124)

"Political action, on the other hand,

is governed by a calculation which abstracts frorr. the subjective, and i.s
directed exclusively toward what can be brought before.the mind as an object."
(125)

(3)

"Free personal action must be ultirrately moved by a faith in sorre-

. thing transcending it.

Otherwise, the person i.>ill become enslaved to what he

is, and lose his freedom." (126)

"Political action, on the other hand, must be

(121)

Ibid., p. 208.

(122)

Ibid. ,

p. 202.

(123)

Ibid., p. 203.

(124)

Ibid. , p. 203.

(125)

Ibid., p. 204.

(126)

Ibic1. , p. 206.
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grounded in a common agreement of many individuals concerning a possible
common end for the rea.lizaticn of which there is grouncl. for hope."

(4)

(127)

"Personal action is clearly aware of the historic past, whj_ch weighs i.t

down and limits its possibilities. But it is precisely this past which is
riskec. in a project fer the future.

11

(128)

11

Pclitical calculation, on the

other hand, is based upon a priority of the past.

Its

~dm

is to realize

a nature ths.t has a.lreci.dy been agree.cl upon in the form of an accepted
constHut:'..on. 11 (129)

In bridging this ga.p, Wild first considers the nature of per sen
and group.

Then, he points cut hew past tl-,eories have tried to solve the

problem by reducing the person into the group.

And finally, he proposes a

new bridge as viewed by ptenomenology.

In his treatment of person and group, he looks at group patterns
fron; the standpoint cf personal freedom.

His aim is

11

tc suggest the

relational interdependence of the individue.l and the group, and the \my in
which they exist in and for ea.ch other.

(13C)

He concJ udes that the person

alone, while existir..g objectively for others, exists in and for himself in a
concrete world of his own, ordered toward his ultimate concern.

All groups

except the primary I-Thou group are imperfect and potential and exist only for
the free person.

The ultimate meaning of groups, therefore, must be understood

in terms of the role they play in this personal existence.

(127)
(129)

Ibid. , p. 206.
Ibid. , p. 207.

(128)
(130)

Ibid.' p. 207.
Ibid. , p. 207.
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However, individuals do belong to groups and in so far as they do
they function and think for others.

As opposE:d to the dyn2.mic and creative

life of the individual the world of society is relatively fixed and static.
It rr.ovef. according to patterns and can be explained causally as a thing.

Of

course, the free persor.. cannot be expl2.inec. in this way but instead is unc.erstood by a disciplined, revealing sympathy. (131)
have different traits and properties.
different ways.

Her..ce, persons and groups

They exist and are understood in

Neither can exist wittc. . ut tLe other.

But because they are

so radically distinct a gap is grounded jn their very being.
In t1'.e past philosophers have tried to bridge it by "a.dopting c>.n
objective point of view and subordinating the individual to the group."(132)
They have never sharply distinguished individual and soical ethics.
not taken into account the free individual.

They have

Instead, they have been content

to strive for order and peace as the end of ethics.
However, "the tradition has been wrong in maintaining that the
end of social justice is a reign of peace and order in which freedom has only
an abstract right to express itself." (133)

For, "the aim of social justice

is not the abstract possibility of personal freedom but the actual practise
of it." (134)

Hence, "every human institution hsould be judged by the degree

to which it is open to the actual practise of freedom." (135)

(131)

Ibid., p. 224.

(132)

Ibid., p. 226.

(134)

Ibid., p. 229.

(135)

Ibid., p. 229.

(133)

Ibid., p. 229.
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In the end, Wild means to bridge the gap by using natural law
social ethics in order ot promote the freedom of the individual.

And it is

precisely this concrete freedom of the individual which has replaced the
natural law ethics of the individual.

For Wild's new ethics (if you can call

it that) of the individual is not a theory at all.

In fact, his theory is

that you cannot have a theory concerning the ethics of the individual.
Hence, there are two types of ethics, the one of objective group
behaviour and the other of subjective freedom.

The gap between them can be

bridged if it is seen that "neither one can exist without the other.
from realization, freedom cannot even exist.

Apart

But apart from freedom, self-

realization: becomes a dead repetition of lofty principles that reeks of
righteousness." (136)
So society which is encased in natural law principles supports
an individual freedom which is understood by an entirely different set of
categories.
choose.

"Instead of good and evil, we find choice or the failure to

Instead of right and wrong, we find personal integrity and

disintegration.

Instead of obligation, we find love; instead of justification,

understatement and humility; instead of justice, forgiveness; and instead
of self-realization, generosity and sacrifice." (137)
So much then, for a general summary of the new position of John
Wild.

Now we are ready to forge ahead and seek a deeper penetration of his

transition by a consideration of detail.
(136)

Ibid., p. 233.

(137)

Ibid., p. 233.

We have already considered in general the various meanings of
philosophy which Wild has entertained.

But now we shall consider in detail

his latest understanding of philosophy or the philosophy of the Lebenswelt.
In order not to be repetitious we shall take up f_ive details which we have
not yet developed.

First, we shall consider Wild's recent explanation of the

merger between phenomenology and existentialism; second, his appreciation of
William James as phenomenologist and existentialist; third, philosophy as
therapeautic; fourth, philosophy as human process;and fifth, Wild's contrast
of philosophy with science and with the humanities.

In his most recent book, Existence and the World of Freedom,
Wild sets out to solve the problem of how phenomenology and existentialism
can be one even though they were started by different men, in different
places and at different times.

Kierkegaard,who is generally recognized as

the Father of existentialism, lived in Denmark from 1813 to 1858.

The

phenomenological movement began at the turn of the century in Germany with
Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl.

Today Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel and

Sartre are phenomenological existentialists.

Kierkegaard was primarily

concerned with subjective existence; Husserl with essences and the things
themselves.

How then can one speak of a phenomenological existentialist?

Was Kierkegaard a phenomenologist?

Was Husserl an existentialist?

Are

Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel and Sartre true followers of both Kierkegaard and
Husserl?

These are questions which occur even to the beginner and Wild, who

skimmed over them in previous works, now takes them up in the second chapter
of Existence and the World of Freedom which he entitles Human Existence and

r
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~enomenology.

Wild points out a common negative attitude at the origin of
both existentialism and phenomenology.

They each grew out of dissatisfaction

with a philosophy too far removed from lived experience.

Kierkegaard, when

meditating on Hegel's claim to have reduced the whole of Christian life to
a system, realized that Christianity is very different when studied from the
outside as an object than it is when lived from within.

He discovered that

existence c·ould be adequately grasped only from within and other knowledge
was but observance of essences.

Thus, he became concerned with the affective

knowledge which reveals existence by such feelings as boredom, melancholy,
anxiety, despair, etc.

Thus, Wild writes,

"By existentialism, we shall mean a new mode of thought, initiated by
Kierkegaard, which attempts to approach the problem of being by a
careful study of personal existence as concretely lived. It differs
from classical realism in denying that such existence can be
adequately understood by the use of objective categories such as
thing, time, and space in their traditional senses. It differs from
modern idealism in holding that the transcendental self is the
human person in the concrete, and that he and his human world are
open to disciplined empirical study." (138)
Brentano and Husserl in criticizing British Empiricism discovered
the intentional notion of consciousness.

They did away with the dichotomy

between subject and object by discovering that
sciousness of something.

No longer could the subject be seen as a substance

enclosed within itself which could

(138)

every consciousness is con-

contain atomic units of experience.

This

John D. Wild, Existence and the World of Freedom, Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963, p.20-21.
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notion of intentionality "led Husserl and Heidegger LO their discovery' of the
human life world, or Lebenswelt, as Husserl called it." (139)
Thus, existentialism and phenomenology each began with a dissatisfaction with abstract, removed-from-life

ph~losophy.

They were each

concerned with consciousness and the lived-world which could be known in
another way than as mere object.

But Husserl thought that in order for each

man to understand his Lebenswelt, there must be a transcendent consciousness
which could be related to us intentionally.
ego which could observe the world as a whole.

Thus, he posited the transcendenta
But this and the bracketing of

existence in order to know the thing as object has been rejected by Heidegger
and other phenomenologists.
The French especially maintain that we can know our self in self
conscious activity.

Thus,

The living phenomenology of our time is precisely the disciplined
cultivation of this type of awareness which dwells in our lived
existence, attending to it, developing it, and clarifying it without
objectif¥ing it and placing it in an alien frame. This is what
phenomenology means to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty; and even Heidegger,
strongly influenced by the German, transcendental tradition, has
abandoned the transcendental ego and the transcendental reduction.(140)
He further writes that "the aim of phenomenology is to penetrate through all
these disguises and concealments (of ordinary language) to the things themselves, to uncover them, and to discover what they really mean." (141)
In describing how the phenomenologist does this work of discovery,
Wild explains three epoch~s or bracketings which are original with him and
(139)

Ibid., p.3l.

(140)

Ibid.,p. 34.

(141)

Ibid., p. 34.

First, we must bracket

quite different from the three bracketings of Husserl.

our own personal feelings whenever we want to discover the individual or
cultural event of another.

We must go directly to the thing itself without

being hampered by personal bias.

Second, we must move from an individual

or cultural event to the meaning of this event for the human world.

We must

bracket the individual and examine the meaning of the thing for all men.
Third, we must even bracket, our opinion about the human world and become
open to a wider horizon which Wild calls "the world".

In this epoche, he

seeks to get beyond Human meaning to the meaning of a possible transcendent
other.

As we shall see in part four of this section, this is his natural

theology or way to God.
Thus, philosophy can be both existential and phenomenological for
Wild.

As we see how he treats existence, freedom, and God this will become

more clear.

But for the moment, we shall briefly see why Wild appreciates

William James as phenomenologist and existentialist in order to better understand Wild's philosophy.
Wild now understands "philosophy as a description and interpretation of our existence as it is lived in the concrete, and, therefore, in
closer touch with the actual philosophic process that is ever proceeding in
living men." (142)

He thinks that James understood philosophy in this way

also and thus, "in his own way contributed to every one of the major phases
of existentialist thought that we have mentioned." (143)

(142)

Ibid., p. 28.

(143)

Wild observes how

Ibid., p. 29.
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James protested also against Hegel and that ivory tower philosophy which is
separated from concrete and subjective existence.

Wild's appreciation of

James is well put in his own words:
Constantly on his guard against subjectivism, he was able to describe
these phenomena and to catch their tone a.nd existential style. Like
other existential thinkers before and after him, he realized that
freedom lay deeper in our human being than any mere difference of a
single faculty, the will; he devoted a lifelong attention to it, and
in his Psychology identified it basically with the direction of
mental attention to a single object of Concern. Always skeptical
of the traditional dualism of mind vs. body, he struggled constantly
to grasp human behaviour integrally in a way that would do justice to
both its "mental" as well as its "physical" aspects, and often used
the word "existence" to grasp them in their being together.
Perceiving rightly that we cannot get outside our lived existence
to make up propositions which may agree or disagree with it, he
worked out many penetrating criticisms of the correspondence theory
of truth. While he never arrived at a satisfactory formulation of
his own pragmatic theory, he was right in groping for a more
primordial kind of truth, which directly reveals our existence in
the world as we live it, and which is confirmed by its historical
fruitfulness. Like Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and other existential
philosophers, he recognized the fragility and essential finitude
of our human existence of any guiding faith. Though in his own
country, James's ideas have been buried by different trends of
thought associated with the word "pragmatism," they have been
deeply studied and cultivated in Europe where, as we shall see,
they have contributed to the movement now known as phenomenolcigy.(144)
Having seen the relation between Wild's philosophy and that of
James, we shall now examine what Wild means by philosophy as therapeutic.
Consider his statement "Academic philosophy, as we can see in the Platonic
portrait of Socrates, was first conceived as a therapeutic discipline which
should try to clarify and to purify this process of primary thinking that
constantly goes on in every man." (145)

In order to understand the therapeutic

value of philosophy let us begin with the difference between primary thinking
(144)

Ibid., p. 30.

(145)

Ibid., p. 89.
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and secondary reflection.

Wild writes,
Primary thought is spontaneous, always concerned and interested,
often creative, but uncritical. It is to this type of thought that
we owe the first original answers that have been given to the
ambiguities and agonies of life. But when left to itself, without
criticism, this style of reflection becomes provincial, fanatical,
and closed to what is universally human. Secondary reflection, on
the other hand, is reflective and disinterested, self-conscious,
critical, and open to the universal. It is through this type of
secondary reflection, when it is in touch with the former, that
fanaticism is avoided, and our existence in the life;-.world is kept
open and free. When left to itself, however, it becomes abstract
sterile, and uncreative. (146)
Now notice the words "when it is in touch with the former."
Wild is scandalized by philosophy or secondary reflection when it separates
itself from the world of primary thought and seeks to construct a world of
its own.

Philosophy should be a clarification and criticism of the vital

processes of the Lebenswelt.

It should not reject the data of lived experience

as sloppy and confused and if it does it must become artificial and sterile.
According to Wild the philosopher phenomenologically performs his three
epoches and thus, reflects on the primary thought of the Lebenswelt.
become abstracted from this life world is the philosophical error.

To
The

philosopher, therefore, must not be a system builder but a describer of life's
process.

In fact, following James, Wild even speaks of a "primary
philosophic process that actually goes on in every living man throughout the

(146)

Ibid., p. 62.
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waking hours, and as we now know, often through the sleeping hours of his
daily life." (147)

Thus, Wild considers philosophy not only to be on the

level of secondary reflection but also on the level of primary thought.

He

writes that ther is an "actual philosophic process which is always proceeding
in the lives of living men." (148)

As a result, Philosophy can have "vital

contact with art, literature, and religion, and with the other living
institutions of our culture." (149)
At this point, we might ask how does Wild's philosophy differ
from art, literature, religion, etc?

Since we have an implicit primary

knowledge in our very activity and since this is made explicit in art,
literature, etc., why aren't these also philosophy?

Wild tries to answer

this by showing that philosophy is neither sciencenor merely art, literature,
etc.

He writes that philosophy "is not concerned with scientific facts of

nature but, like history, literature, and the fine arts, with world-facts of
the Lebenswelt.

Unlike these disciplines, however, it is not so much

concerned with individual acts of freedom, and parti_cular views of the
world, as with those general limiting conditions under which freedom is
always exercised, and the structure of the world itself, such as wotld-space,
world-time, historicity, choice, and death." (150)
That philosophy is not science is quite understandable in Wild's
context and will become even more clear when we consider the philosophic study
of existence.

However, it is now time to consider Wild's concept of freedom

(147)

Ibid., p. 62.

(150)

Ibid., p. 228.

(148)

Ibid., p. 79.

(149)

Ibid., p. 79.
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and this consideration will, I think, shed new light on the difference between
Wild's philosophy and art, literature, etc.
Wild claims that Philosophy is "the discipline of freedom." (151)
In order to understand this, we shall begin by se.eing why he considers world
understanding to be free.

At this point, we shall not see in detail what

Wild means by lived-world since that is to be taken up in the next part.
However, he thinks that everyone has a lived-world which he has freely
constituted and which, therefore, "requires a free method of active participation and interpretation" (152) if it is to be understood.

In his own words:

This method has always been used, at least half-consciously, by the
best practitioners of the human disciplines, but recently it has
been further refined and clarified by Husserl and his followers.
As we have observed, in order to understand any human phenomenon,
like the magic and myths of a primitive people, a critical decision
on the part of a living person, or even a past experience of his
oW-n, the phenomenologist must first free himself fnom his present
biases and prefer2nces bracketing them, as is said, or putting them
out of action so far as this is possible. Only by exercising this
free act of self-negation or epoche, as it is called, do we gain
access to the phenomenon as it was lived and understood by the agents
themselves. But this is not the whole story. Afterthis, another
epoche is necessary. Once again, we must try to free ourselves from
the limitations of these difference versions by gaining a distance
from them, and by asking the question: what do they really mean?
Only in this way can we finally open ourselves to the sense of
the phenomenon as it really is in the world. We cannot understand
the free acts of men without ourselves participating in this same
freedom.
I believe that this exercise of free understanding is the peculiar
characteristic of philosophy among the other academic sciences and
subjects. Xany of them are concerned with the construction of pure
theories which s_hould correspond with the objective facts. Others,
more practical and technological, are concerned with the control
over nature. But philosophy is concerned with the life-world of man

(152)

Ibid. , p. 122.
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and its free constitution. It is, in a special sense, the discipline
of freedom. .Making use of the phenomenological method we have just
described, we see that it attempts to understand this world of man,
its common structures, its varying modes, and its multiple manifestation. (153)
I find it difficult to understand what Wild means here.

The

difficulty begins with his interpretation of the phenomenological method.
If we experience existence and the lived-world ori the level of primary thought,
how are we going to keep from distorting them if we seek to understand them
phenomenologically by means of the three epoches.

It seems to me that this

secondary reflection is the very objectification of the thing which Wild is
trying to avoid.

It seems that the very distance from the thing which the

second bracketing implies is a failure

ID be with the thing itself as it

really is.
Secondly, I fail to see how we can understand the free acts of
other men if we stand back from them.

Wild says we must participate in their

freedom and as he indicates in other places, this must be by means of the
imagination which we employ with the bracketing.

However, it would seem that

we must become involved with them more completely than by just the imagination.
At this point, I think a major weakness in Wild's method begins
to show itself.

Because he doesn't really appreciate intersubjectivity, his

few statements which creep in such as the last sentence of this paragraph,lack
meaning.

He cannot really explain participation in terms of bracketing.

hasn't really merged the risky plunge into being with the bracketing and
(153)

Ibid., p. 122-123.
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scientific method of Husserl.
But getting back to our subject, Wild would maintain that
philosophy is free because world understanding is free.

World understanding

is free because the life world of man is freely C?nstituted.
to our

wor~ds.

We give meaning

The philosopher "is especially concerned with the process of

free understanding by which these world-versions are constituted, and by the
common conditions such as life-space, human time, history, death,meaning, and
existence itself, under which this freedom is exercised." (154)

But what is

freedom?
Wild associates the words spontaneous, active and indeterminate
with freedom.

A free act must be spontaneous or "independent and self

originating within the agent." (155)
receptive.
not free.

It must not be merely passive and

If I am pushed about, restricted or obsessed, I am to that degree
Also, freedom is indeterminant.

can do only one thing then I am not free.

There must be alternatives.

If I

Wild defines freedom as an active-

being-open-to-what-is-other.
Wild claims that philosophy is the discipline of freedom and
singles out three of its characteristics in order to show how each is free.
First, philosophy is free because it is speculative and systematic.

In

working out his own version of the world the philsoopher must keep himself
free from assumptions and presuppositions.
frame of another is to be a mental slave.

(154)

Ibid., p. 124.

To exist unwittingly in the world
Philosophy in its speculative

(155)

Ibid., p. 127.
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aspect is also free because it is the guardian of Freedom and independence.
"Philosophy is not an objective science.
integrity and independence.

It is rather the guardian of human

When understood in this way, the history of

philosophy appears neither as a mere chaos of conflicting views nor as a
processio~

of unrivaled dogmatisms.

It is rather a perpetual search for

world-understanding, and that personal freedom of mind on which such understanding depends." (156)
Next, philosophy should be free in its linguistic and logical
functions.

The philosopher should be open to the worlds of others and thus,

the importance of public discourse and communication.

"The existence of a

free society depends on communication in depth by free men.
here are basically of a philosophical order.

The difficulties

Of all the different academic

disciplines, philosophy is in the most favorable position to give us aid.
Once again these facts suggest that philosophy is the discipline of
freedom." (157)
Philosophy is also free in its critical function.

Hen like

Socrates and Kant question every supposition and every manifestation of
dogmatism in order to keep philosophy open and free.

Philosophy "represents

neither life, nor truth, nor goodness, nor beauty; nothing, indeed, but the
spfrit of freedom on earth, the self-transcendence of man.'' (158)

Whenever

philosophy claims to have arrived at an absolute, unchangeable truth or system
it becomes scandalous.

(156)

Ibid., p. 134.

Its goal is to free men for progressive understanding.

(157)

Ibid., p. 136.

(158)

Ibid., p. 138.

r
Philosophy is distinguished from the other arts and sciences
because of its special relation to freedom.

They all have a more confined

goal and are concerned with something more narrow than the freedom of man.
Philosophy seeks spontaneously, actively and indeterminantely to grasp the
whole of the life-world and not merely a fragment of it.
From this it is evident that Wild does not reduce freedom to a
characteristic of the will.

It is also a characteristic of understanding.

Freedom does not depend on understanding alone but freedom is the very source
of understanding.
free.

Man can creatively construct his life world because he is

Because man is open to the other, he can go beyond himself.

not only to facts but also to meaning.
this freedom of man.

He is open

The Academy has as its duty to protect

It should defend and result in a fuller life world.

In

its therapeutic function it purifies primary understanding and fress one from
its suppositions.
world.

Thus, philosophy freely constitutes and maintains the life

But now to better understand this free philosophy, let us examine the

world it knows or the existence it creates.
Wild is interested in existence in the Kierkegaardian sense of
"subjective" lived experience.
without but only from within.

Hence, it cannot be known objectively from
He approaches the problem of being by a study

of personal existence as concretely lived.

This person is always the center

of a world which is permeated by care, human space, human time and other
structures which Wild thinks can be known philosophically.

But before we

consider these structures individually, we shall first study what he means by
lived-world, world fact, world meaning and world truth.

He develops his idea of the lived-world by contrasting it with
the objective or scientific world.

He thinks the lived-world has been rejected

as an object of philosophic study since the time of plato who considered it to
be the shadow world.
been

scie~tific

Until the

~esent

day, Wild thinks that philosophy has

by which he means that philosophers have abstracted from the

whole of experience in order to understand a certain objective segment.

These

scientific philosophers have rejected the subjective and reduced all being to
an object.

But the lived-world, which even every scientist lives in, is not a

things, it is "an ultimate horizon within which all such objects and the
individual person himself are actually understood in the 'natural attiude' of
everyday life." (159)
This 'natural attitude' includes all kinds of primary knowing
such as feeling, thought, imagination and any natural power.

The primary

aspect of this attitude is the care which constitutes the order of the world.
This pen is for writing; that shovel for digging.
thing, it is part of the lived-world.

If an object is for some-

In order to better understand this

lived-world, we shall follow Wild in his distinction between scientific facts
and world facts.
World facts are concrete, independent of any special mode of
approach and subjectively experienced from within.

Scientific facts on the

other hand, are abstract, partially dependent on special modes of observation
and purely objective.

(159)

Ibid., p. 41

This, of course, is in keeping with Wild's distinction

r
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between primary knowledge and secondary reflection. · World facts are known by
primary knowledge; scientific facts by secondary reflection.

Wild calls the

first type of facts world facts because they appear on the unlimited horizon
of the world.

Science has more restricted horizon which in its quest for

objectivit:;y deprives world facts of their ambiguity and openness.

It doesn't

see them as stretched out in time but it is content with broken off segments.
The facts of science are not temporal and existential.
But there are more than world facts; there are world meanings.
By a fact Wild refers to "any bit of evidence that is forced upon our attention, whether we will or not. .. They are disparate and disorganized." (160)
Meaning,on the other hand, is "the result of a unique interchange between man
and the independent things and persons around him." (161)

By this understand-

ing of meaning, Wild rejects both the traditional realistic and idealistic
understanding of meaning.

Meaning does not exist independently in nature to

be received by an empty and passive mind nor is it created do nova

py

the

human mind.
As with facts, there are two kinds of meanings:
the scientific.
global.

the world and

Scientific meanings are again abstract and partial rather than

They are causal and allow for predictability.

But world meaning or

interpretation does not aim at prediction and causal control; it seeks merely
to understand.
This world understanding begins with world facts in their

(160)

Ibid., p. 66.

(161)

Ibid., p. 69.
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immediacy, but it goes beyond them.

According to Wild, it is achieved by the

second epoche which we previously mentioned.

Here the phenomenologist seeks

to clarify "those structures like .::time, history, freedom, death, and world
itself, which seem to belong necessarily to human existence, and thus, to make
any human world version possible." (162)

World meanings are called forth in

our daily struggle with alien forces "by a creative factor in man, which takes
account of the facts and yet goes on beyond them." (163)

Meanings are always

open to further questioning, clarification, deepening and reinterpretation.
Now, together with world fact and world meaning, there is also
world truth.

Wild thinks that a certain understanding of the facts can be

called true if it will hold up in time, if it is fruitful, if it calls forth
authentic existence in history.

Thus, the criterion for world truth is not

correspondence as it is for objective truth but rather authenticity.

World

truth depends on how we hold the patterns of world meaning and how we live
them through.
Thus, the existence which Wild is interested in as a philosopher
has the three levels of world fact, world meaning and world truth.

But,

this type of existence cannot be spoken of as the object of his philosophy.
For it is precisely not an objective existence.

Wild is interested in an

unobjectified existence, in existence as it is lived, rather than as it is
studied by the scientist.

In order to see how he approachs this unobjectified

existence, we shall single out the theme of anxiety from that list which

(162)

Ibid., p. 73.

(163)

Ibid., p. 73.

which includes:

world, body, situationality, guilt, death, etc.

Following Kierkegaard and Heidegger, Wild points out what
anxiety is by contrasting it with fear.
for a definite reason.

I am afraid of a definite thing

But when the anxious person is questioned what he is

anxious about, he answers 'nothing' and he is right.

One is anxious about

no-thing but about the whole of his existence in the world.

It reveals the

difference between oneself as a function and as a person.
However, anxiety is a state which can be evaded.
his anxiety by derived forms of fear.
existence.

One can replace

In short, he can flee his personal

He can escape from that which threatens the whole of his being-to-

the-end (in Heidegger's words) by deciding to be sensible and to go about his
business.

If he, thus, becomes a 'business man' rather than a person, he

loses the anxiety and also the freedom to which anxiety is the gateway.

Wild doesn't develop in detail the relation between anxiety
and freedom but seems to expect one to go to Kierkegaard and Heidegger.

In

fact, he merely hints at the meaning of all the structures of the lived-world.
In fact, this regard he never goes beyond the summary work that he did in
The Challenge of Existentialism.
However, he has worked out a type of existential proof for the
existence of God based upon the dialectical thension between freedom and
order, which we should now examine in order to further understand the basic
notions of his philosophy.

We shall examine this proof under three aspects:

first, we shall see that iit is the only type of proof which Wild thinks will

r

arrive at a personal God.
proof.

Second, we shall see that Wild means by existential

Third, we shall state his proof.
Before

beginning his proof, Wild comments on the distinction of

Pascal between the God of the Philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac and
Jacob.

He agrees with Pascal that these two Gods are not the same.

He states

specifically that the approach to God of the Cartesians and the Idealists is
irrelevant and reductionistic.

By this, he means that because of their

objective, rationalistic, reasoning process, they do not really prove the
existence of the real personal God of the religious man.
personal God to a thing.

It seems that he

against Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas.

~ould

They reduce this

also level this critique

However, in the next section when

we take up his critique of Thomism, we shall consider this in detail.

But

for now let it suffice to say that Wild doesn't think that previous philosophic
arguements for the existence of God are valid because they reduce God to a
thing and, therefore, do not really reach Him.
However, Wild thinks that the task of proving God's existence is
not hopeless for the philosophers.

He thinks that the phenomenological

existentialist is able to do this.

This is so because his method is not

objectively rationalistic and reductive in the traditional manner.
is this method?

But what

What is an existential proof?

Wild states that this kind of argument has two parts.

First,

the philosopher states and describes as accurately as he can certain facts
which are familiar in some degree to almost all men.

Second, he reflects on

these facts and sees that they point to what he is,proving.

In his own words,

The following argument will proceed in this manner. It will start
with certain lived experiences, or world facts, as we have called
them, with which we are all familiar. It will then attempt to
clarify the meaning of these facts. This is what is meant by an
existential argument. (164)
The world fact with which Wild begins is "the restlessness of our
existence-in-the-world, which drives us beyond any fixed form or pattern and
works in us as a first, creative ferment in our human history." (165)
Wild describes the history of philosophy as an example of this restlessness.
There is a quest for meaning which works at the center of human history.

This

quest results in a theory which man hopes will enable him to interpret all the
facts.

But as soon as the order of the theory is established other facts are

seen which are unexplained and revolution sets in.
these other facts men is in search of a new system.

Because of his openness to
Thus, man's history is

marked by a dialectic between freedom and order.
The next fact which he considers is one that has been learned
from this hisotry of creative disillusionment.
It has been discovered that forms of undiluted tyranny and those of
anarchic freedom are unworkable. Only those patterns which combine
a maximum of freedom together with a maximum of order seem to be
authentically human. But these words express an ideal that can be
only remotely approximated, and no institutional order that has ever
been, or ever will be actually established, seems likely to escape
from the force of creative criticism. (166)

(164)

Ibid., p. 206.

(165)

Ibid., p. 206.

(166)

Ibid., p. 207.

61

Stating this in another way, he writes,·
Pure freedom, after negating every fixed pattern, becomes uncreative,
and wastes itself away. Unity, on the other hand, as soon as it is
established and freed from tension, becomes rigid and dies. Freedom
needs order, and unity needs freedom, but in the imperfect modes
which we can achieve, neither can bear the other. And yet as long as
we remain human, we are lured toward a perfect order and a perfect
fri;edom which would somehow coincide. (167)
Next, Wild asks himself what is the ultimate sense of this
restless tension between freedom and unity.

In answer to this question,

he ·writes that ''that being-open-to-otherness whi.ch lies at the heart of
this dialectic leads toward what is wholly other--radically transcendent ...
It is moving from the passive, uncreative, determinate, and multiple toward
an infinite which is active, creative, indeterminate, and purely one."(168)
In concluding, he writes,
The conclusion of the argument is this: the free action which lies
at the heart of cultural, and even more of individual history, points
to a transcendent unity, which is the ultimate, creative source of
meaning and being, and of the unity of the world. (169

Wild calls this an argument of motion rather than notion.
order to be convinced by it, one must experience it.

In

He thinks that many

men do and he cites examples of it such as religious conversion, or the
appreciation of a new and wider philosophic viewpoint.
In concluding this section, I would remark that this arguw.ent
of Wilds seems to be colored with a certain optimism.
arguing from a felt need to a fact.

(167)

Ibid., p. 207-208.

(168)

It seems that he is

He seems to say that we have a need for

Ibid., p. 209.

(169)

Ibid., p. 209.
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the transcendent and infinite other ancI, therefore, it is.

Maybe there wouldn'

even by any meaning tmless this ultimate ground of meci.ning existed.
seems to assume that things do have meaning.
But, I doubt if Sartre would.

But Wild

I would agree with him in this.

This argument merely reaffirms the conviction

of the believer in meaning.
Having examined Wild's realism and his Lebenswelt philosophy, we
shell now consider the relation between these two positions by observing how
he criticizes realism as a Lebenswelt

philesoph~r.

In order to do this, we

shall sE;e how he criticizes St. Thomas and two contemporary Thomists.
information, we shall use his essay, Christian Rationalism.

For this

We shall divide

his criticism of St. Thomas into four parts concerning knowledge, being,
God and man.
Wild begins his essay by writing that St. Thomas' purpose was to
synthesize Greek philosophy and Christian faith.

Re describes how these two

traditions idffered and how they converged in St. Thomas.
the chief representative of Christian theology.
existentialist.
Christianity.
of life.

St. Augustine was

In many ways, he was an

He held that faith,not reason,was the foundation of
Religion was not to be understood as a theory but as a way

However, when the philosophical texts of the Greeks and Arabians

were translated into Lati.r: the scholars of Western Europe saw a new vision.
"This opened their minds_ to the possibility of a purely rational exploration
of the realm of nature, unfettered by any dogmas of faith, and inaugurated
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a long and bitter struggle between rational science and faith.'' (170)

Wild

goes on to argue that St. Thomas was deeply influenced by the Greek scientific
spirit and as a result "his great synthesis was weighted heavily on the
Aristotelian side and there were few Augustinians, familiar with his works,
who failed· to see that it was inspired by Athens rather than by Je.rusalem."(171:
St. Thomas' procedure was guided froil' beginning to end by the
Aristotelian concept of science.

Wild writes that,

"Aquinas follows Aristotle in defending the notion of an absolutely
empty reason which can assimilate. the natures of all things and
apprehend the whole cosmic order from a detached point of view
outside the world."(172)
Of course, Wild puts special emphasis on the detachment of science.

Since

it disregards the knowledge of involvement because it considers it to be
unscientific, Wild is opposed to the scientific procedure of St. Thomas.
He thinks, as we have seen, that man has a type of knowledge as a result of
his being involved in the world that can be philosophic even though it isn't
scientific.

As a result of this knowledge of involvement, the Lebenswelt

philosopher thinks that he alone can justly treat human existence, freedom,
time, etc.
Thus, Wild argues

that this "pure, theoretical knowledge" (173)

of St. Thomas receives only the formal structures of things.
of grasping existence.

It is incapable

Wild writes, St. Thomas' ' 1approach is basically

(170)

WilliaU? Earle, James H. Edie and John Wild, Christianity and Existential ism; Evanston: Northwestern University Press,1963. p. 42.

(171)

Ibid., p. 44.

(172)

Ibid., p. 45.

(173) Ibid.,p.45.

64

_formalistic, and he starts with a definition, not a description.''
t'.

~For

(17~)

this reason,
"his major w--ri.tings la.ck ar.y vital flavor of concrete existence and
are remote from the facts of hi.story. In his theology, it is the
Platonism of Augustine rather than his biblical thinking that he
follows. In spite of many alternations and adaptations in a
Christian direction, his system is a great expression of Greek
rationalism." (175)

I
II

Also Wild thinks that this scientific knowledge of St. Thomas is

purely passive.

It only

"Absorbs the forms of things as they already are and must be, and
then expresses them in the form of objective judgments. When
functioning properly, it is never active in the sense of being
original or creative." (176)

~

Wild also thinks that this
"theoretical assimilation even plays an essential role in what
Aristotle called practical reason, for it determines the whole
world frame in which the action is to take place, and sets the end.
We choose and deliberate only about the means, never justifiably
about the natural end." (177)

!'
!

I
~ii

So Wild levels the charges of formalism and rationalism against

l

~Thomas' scientific approach to philosophy.

1ed

He thinks that Thomas has restrict-

himself to a merely passive type of knowledge which will not adequately

!,treat the lived-world and the life of faith.

He thinks that Thomas in some

iway hinders practical reason by restricting it with theoretical reason.

Lne is.

;
1

h.1nt1ng
.
. Th omas I et h.ics.
at a wea k ness in

Thus,

Of course, w'1 ld wi· 11 a 1 so

II

jcriticize his theories of being, God and man because they are based on this

(174)

Ibid., p. 50.

(175)

Ibid., p. 51.

'(176)

Ibid., p. 45.

(177)

Ibid., p. 45.
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~

:!faulty concept of philoso;i:-.:::..c :mowledge.

i
i
j

In a manner which reminds one of Heidegger's theme concerning

ri

lthe forgetfullness of being, Wild summarizes in a short paragraphy all that
he thinks St. Thomas had to say about being and concludes,
"Aside from this,Aquinas has little to say about being, though he
pays it high compliments. He concieves of it as an objective
presence before the mind or as the possiblity of such a presence.
That which cannot be brought before the mind or the senses in this
way does not exist. 11 (178)

.Thus, Wild thinks that Thomas has objectified being.

Thomas says that it is

the first and widest of all concepts and that it cannot be defined.

! concept

which even includes God by analogy.

11

It is a

In.:the case of finite entities,

it is the act which brings them out of the imperfect state of potency and
places them among things." (179)
is sterile.

But to Wild this type of meditation on being

It is blind to the being of the lived-world.

St. Thomas'

philosophical and theological writings "are highly impersonal, objective,
and abstract and convey little sense of passion, or, indeed, of any human
existential feeling." (180)

In short, Wild thinks that,

b

"Aquinas says that being is very important, and he ev.en implies in
certain statements that it is more important than essence (whatness).
But they are hard to reconcile with his apparently unqualified
acceptance of Aristotelian rationalism and formalism. 11 (181)
Wild also criticizes St. Thomas' proofs for the existence of God
and his theory concerning the attributes of God.
concerning Thomas' concept of the world.

He begins with a few remarks

Since these are so individual, I

shall quote them in full.

I
i

(178)

Ibid • , p . 4 6 .

(181)

Ibid., p. 49.

(179)

Ibid. , p. 45.

(180)

Ibid. , p. 48.
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~

"Aquinas, like Aristotle, was never able to understand how any finite
~.·
being, even a living organism, can move itself. Hence, every finite
~
motion and every finite act which realizes a potentiality must have
an external cause that is already in act. Otherwise, something would ~
happen without a reason, the cosmos would be reduced to chaos, and
~
ultimately the law of contradiction would be violated. These rules
~
of objective human thinking are regarded by Aquinas as ontological
~
principles which actually govern all the events of nature and history. '
This consistent application of the Aristotelian causal principle leads.
to a strangely static conception of a universe heavily guarded and
hemmed in by formal chains. Nothing can be brought into existence
unless there is a definite essence already there in potency and ready
to receive it. And even while it exists, it cannot move unless there
are causes already thereto bring it into act. In this strictly
ordered cosmos, existence seems to be dealt out grudgingly and only
under carefully restricted conditions." (182)

I

Then, he writes,
"God is the single exception. He alone can act without restriction.
In fact, He must necessarily do so, for His essence is the pure act
of being." (183)
Next, Wild states that according to Thomas the existence of God
"can be syllogistically demonstrated.: (184)

After very briefly stating the

•nature of such demonstration, Wild writes,

I
i;

"But is the act of existing always predetermined by a prior whatness?
How do we know that the universe is rational? Must it correspond
exactly to our habits of objective, logical reflection? Except for
references to the authority of the philosopher, Aquinas gives us no
answer to these questions. As Pascal noted, they make no contact
with the intuitive feeling of our lived existence and are, therefore,
singularly lacking in persuasive power." (185)
Only in the light of this last statement, can I understand some

lof the statements which Wild just made above.

I! objective reasoning and demonstration is not

Perhaps, his point is that
personally moving.

Perhaps, he

I
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)

,is saying there is another type of ontology which describes the world we know
·'in
experience more aptly.
:,

Perhaps he is merely trying to emphasize in a

;I

:i phetorical way that there is another philosophical way of knowing the

i

!existence of God which is more convincing.

I
~

Wild is also critical concerning of St. Thomas' notion of the

!~

!divine attributes.

First, he thinks that Thomas' notion of analogy leads to

!anthropomorphism and a diluting of divine transcendence.

Concerning Thomas'

itheory, he asks, "is man made in the image of this divinity, or is it not
;

•':

jrather true, as Feuerbach suggested, that God is a great construction made in
j

:! ~he

image of man?" (186)

Wild thinks that Tho~nas' lack of respect on the

ii

!philosophic level for God's transcendence is again the result of Greek
~influence.

After naming the various attributes which Thomas deduces from the

'conclusion of his causal arguments Wild writes,
"He is even referred to in strictly Aristotelian terms as the unmoved
mover. This Greek. emphasis on immobile changelessness is hard to
reconcile with the living God of Christian faith, and the cautious
hemming-in of existential activity by essences and causes, as we
have noted, seems out of key with the Christian conceptions of
generosity and love." (187)
Wild writes Aquinas',
"God does not speak to us from remote heights far beyond our
knowledge. He does not lure us on to new thoughts and creative
endeavor. He seems to think very much like Plato and Aristotle,
and instead of urging us to break our chains and to go on our way,
he seems rather to tighten them and to admonish us to look back
and stay as we were." (188)
Thus, Wild thinks that Thomas' philosophy does not allow him to
experience.

Because of his scientific

·spp::-oach Thomas could not treat of a :_:iersonal God.

Wild WTites that, "While

:

: Aquinas expressed a deep sense of mystery in his famous hymns and in cryptic
~

"

statements about his life work, this is not evident in his philosophical and

'.j

~
«

! theological

WTitings." (189)

'

i

Of course, this Greek rationalism also had an effect on Thomas'

I
~

I! theory of man.

!i

It allowed Thomas to treat of man only as a thing.

Wild WTites

"Thus, in his treatise on :rt2n ia the S-Jm;:ia Theologiae, he pays little
or no attention to human existence in the world and ma~es little
effort to catc~ the feeiing and atmosphere of this existence. As
he sees it, this is too confused and variable, and he follows his
master, Aristotle, in holding that there is no science of the
individual. His approach is basically formalistic, and he starts
with a definition, not a description." (190)

;1
•1

·l

'ii

!

~Thus,

again Wild makes the same basic criticism.

Thomas would not allow

!himself as a philosopher to use affective knowledge of the Lebenswelt and

I

thus, his treatment of man was inad~quate.

!I

is not a world.

~

~among

Wild writes that for Thomas, "Man

He is rather a material substance, or thing, in the world

othEr things, which is living, animal, and finally rational." (191)

~

~'

Wild thinks Thomas too scientific.

~

l

He never really meets Thomas.

I
u
:l

After making these criticisms, Wild is quick to urge that he

I

1greatly respects the penetrating and wide-ranging mind of Aquinas.

He tells

I
!how he admires his "shrewd capacity for making fine distinctions with some

!
I·

'basis in observation." (192)

I
i

(189)

Ibid., p. 48.

(192)

Ibid. , i p. 51.

i
I

(190)

But then, he reminds us that we should not

Ibid., p. 49.

(191)

Ibid., p. 50.
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i'follow Aquinas in his mistakes and with this launches an attack upon

I
:,

p:faritain and Gibson whom he thinks have done this.

I'I

Wild begins by pointing out how Gilson and Maritain have

i
,!

!referred to Thomism as "the only authentic existentialism."

In order to

cl

ishow what they mean by this, he gives a short review of Maritain's book
!Existence and the Existent.

Iauthentic

Here Maritain states that Thomism is "the only

existentialism" because of "'the primacy which authentic Thomism
I

accords to existence and to the intuition of existential being' over essence anbecause of the many defects he finds in contemporary existentialism." (193)
!

lwild describes the two most basic charges which ~aritain brings against

'
!existentialism,
namely, "an exclusive concern with the subjective and a
i

!rebellion against the light of reason." (194)

Then, Wild points out that

IMaritain opposes the existentialist ethics because "'by repudiating
lspeculation in favor of action ... it becomes voluntaristic', that is, it

I

i~encourages

a blind action with no concern for its natural end." (195)

Also

i

'
!Maritain
thinks that "the moral teaching of existentialism is "'an absurd
, abyss of pure and formless liberty." (196)
Next, Wild refutes Maritains' refutation of existentialism.

Ibegins by pointing out Maritain has misunderstood the term 'existence'
1

He

as the

I

. existentialists are using it.

Maritain distinguishes essence and existence

uand then in opposition to certain essentialists emphasizes existence.

~

(193)

lb l'd •

p. 52 .

(196)

Ibid.

p. 55.

(194)

Ibid., p. 54.

(195)

Ibid., p. 54.

But the

exist.en·cia.2.ists do not "Gse exis-:e::.ce

i~1

-chis

1.11a.y

at c..:l.

In fact, they even

. cut below the very distinction between essence and exis·cence .

\..'hen they use

J

"
;the
term 'existence' they refer to a human way of being which is temporal and
i1

~

!ecstatic.

l
1

'~

I

"Maritain has not seen that it is the traditional concept of being as
objective presence before the mind that is being questioned. The
issue is far more basic than be believes." (197)

iso according to Wild, Thomism is not "the only authentic existentialism".

i

!In fact, it is not an existentialism at all.

I!

Maritain has misused the term.

In answer to l1aritain' s objection that existentialism is a

!subjectivist philosophy Wild points out that according to the examination of
~

lthe phenomenologists there is no such thing as a sabjective objective dichotomy]
;on the contrary "human existence is intentional or relational in character,

I.

i

-~

!i

"I am where my attention is riveted, where my care is taking me, in
some region of the human world. I am in this world not objectively,
as a paper is in the drawer or as a drop of water is in a glass. I
am in this world as a field of care, as say that a young doctor is in
medicine or that a boy is in love.
"I am not first locked up in a private subjectivity from which I emerge
by special process of "knowledge" which take me out of myself. This
subjectivist picture, which M. Maritain shares with the central
tradition of Western thought, has led only to absurd and unanswerable
questions as to whether there is any external world at all. The
existential thinkers have not merely rejected this false construction;
they have lucidly described many phases of our relational existence
in the light of constraining evidence. They have shown that man is
stretched out into a world from which, as long as he exists, he can
never be separated. Theoretical knowing and speaking presuppose this
world. They are themselves special ways of being in the world.
" ... Not only is existential philosophy not subjectivist; it has now
gone further in working out a radically non-subjectivist view of human .

nstretched out spatially and temporally into a moving field of care." (198)
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existence in the world than all those traditional forms of
objectivism which have a kernel of subjectivism at their very
root." (199)

~

I

I

I

Concerning Maritain:::s charge that existentialism is a rebellion

!against the light of reason Wild shows how he thinks "that this world of our

!
. llived existence is an 'unknowable abyss' and that the disciplined attempt to
jexplore it by the so-called methods of phenomenology leads to a 'destruction

'

i
!of the intellect!" (200)

Then Wild indicates that such a statement of Maritain

~

;,merely shows the weakness of his philosophical position.

I~have

shown that subjective existence can be explored.

The existentialists

They have done it.

I
~

Maritain thinks that existentialism is irrational because of the

,,

Iiway
~of

in which he defines reason.

For him it is the "examination and analysis

objects that can be brought before the mind and senses."(201)

However,

~

rwild thinks that reason is "Discovering and bringing into the light the truth !of things and existents, wherever and however they are." (202)

Consequently,

!

!"the disciplined exploration of the life-world, which has only recently begun,

11' an eminently rational enterprise."

(203)

!
Concerning Maritain's objections to existentialist ethics, Wild
begins by saying that as a result of certain findings of clinical psychology
the existentialists oppose the traditional distinction between intellect and
will. Then, he goes on to argue that "freedom is by no means restricted to a

•1

single faculty, the will." (204)

(199)

The history of philosophy itself shows that

Ibid., p. 58-59.

(200) Ibid., p. 60.

(201)

Ibid., p. 61.

Ibid. ,

(203)

(204)

Ibid., p. 63.

p. 62.

Ibid. p. 63.

II

Ji

j
lman has a certain freedom of mind "which enables :nm to :.:-ebel against
ij
jcrystallized idealogies and to work out a way of life and understanding for
ij

!himself, responsibly."(205)

Even the lived-world is pervaded with freedom

land just because,
"existential thinking has found no evidence sutficient to support the
claim that there are objective norms and principles valid for all
mankind, irrespective of the different histories and circumstances
of different groups,J .. there is no reason to say that it advocates
'a pure and formless liberty.'"(206)
~The

existentialist idea of freedom does imply responsibility in a definite way.
"Value is to be found in existing. Therefore, we can say that any
personal existence that evades or suppresses the lasting limits and
conditions of this existence is not truly human or authentic."(207)
In conclusions Wild writes,
"This must suffice as a brief indication of the kind of answer
that might be given, in a fuller discussion,to the moral charges
made by M. Maritain against existential philosophy." (208)
Thus, we have seen how Wild attacks the old position which he

once defended.

Even as late as his second phase of realism when he wrote

The Challenge of Existentialism he argued much like Maritain with his
distinction between essence and existence, essentialism and existentialism.
As a result of our examination of his objections to realism, we can see how
the two periods of Wild's career differ.
In ending we must say a word about Wild's critique of Thomism.
St. Thomas clearly saw the difference between what Wild calls Lebenswelt

i·

i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

1
(205)

Ibid.

p. 63.

(208)

Ibid.

p. 62.

(206)

Ibid., p. 63

(207)

Ibid., p. 63.

i·,
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( .mowJ..eage

1;

'
an d rational know1 eage.

Bt:.t T",,or:ias neve:c thought t h at the former

\

'!could be philosophical. But his reason for this was not just a simple
~
~acceptance of Greek rationalism.
In fact, as Thomas clearly points out in

:J

ri

!his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius he himself disagrees with the
l

jvery rationalism of the Greeks which Wild accuses him of. He tries to go
~
lbeyond them and discover a way of exploring existence philosophically. (209)
~

I
''Wild does not appreciate this.
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